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Abstract:
Independent auditors serve as gatekeepers of public securities markets, but ongoing com-
petition among audit firms could harm auditors’ independence. For instance, a Green
Paper of the European Union finds that especially audits of large and prestigious clients
are hard-fought in terms of price competition. Major concerns are related to a pricing
behavior called low balling. Here, the auditor sets the first period’s fee below the audit
costs -incurring a loss for the initial audit- in order to win the client. However, as a quasi-
monopoly emerges for the incumbent auditor, he expects to offset this loss in the future.
Mainly, this offset occurs due to reduced audit costs in subsequent periods. Recent man-
agement publications highlight that learning effects influence the cost behavior over time
in two ways. On the one hand, cost reductions emerge from experience due to performing
jobs repeatedly. Thus, learning is supposed to be an important strategic factor in low-
automation industries, like auditing. On the other hand, learning effects can be fostered
by investments in learning, i.e., learning is manageable. Bundling non-audit services, like
risk advisory- or performance measurement-related assurance services, with audits could
be interpreted as audit-quality improving investments in learning about a client’s business.
Accordingly, the goal of our paper is to analyze how learning effects according to the theory
of learning curves affect competition on the audit market and thus the low-balling problem.
Our analysis proceeds in several steps: In the first step, we model-endogenously identify
conditions for the existence of price competition in audit markets. This step of analysis is
important, because in most low-balling models competition is assumed to exist, although
empirical evidence is mixed. In the second step, we analyze how different types of learning
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influence fee setting over time. Here, we assume auditors to have identical learning rates.
This means competition in a given segment is considered, e.g., between Big-4 auditors or
between National Majors. In the third step, we regard auditors with different learning
abilities. Thus, auditors of different size -measured in number of clients- occur. In this
step we capture the fact that empirically size is an important competition factor.
Our results give hints to regulators under which conditions low balling might be a threat
to auditor independence. Further, some recently introduced regulations, which aim at
improving auditor independence, can be evaluated using the framework of our analysis.
Key Words: Auditing, Big-Four, Fee-Cutting, Independence, Low Balling, Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, Scheduling, Theory of Learning Curves
JEL classification: M42, D43, L11
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1 Introduction
The concept of auditor independence covers several notions and has undergone a profound
change over time. For instance, in the 19th century in England auditors were forced to
hold a fraction of their clients’ shares. In contrast, for sake of independence most present
legislations prohibit “auditors from owing shares of their clients’ stock and from possess-
ing any direct financial interest or material indirect financial interest in their clients.”1
Basically, ‘independence in fact’ means that an auditor abstains from any collusive behav-
ior with management. However, as auditing crucially relies on confidence and reputation
‘independence in appearance’ is much more important.2 This means that no “facts and
circumstances are so significant that a reasonable and informed third party ... would ...
conclude a[n audit] firm’s ... integrity, objectivity or professional skepticism [to be] com-
promised.”3 Accordingly, “[a]t least since the Securities Acts, independence has been the
focus of almost constant controversy, debate and analysis.”4
This debate was intensified once again when enacting Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOA).5 Some
commentators generally doubt that auditor independence is worth being saved.6 Other
authors suppose auditors to be “the gatekeepers of the public securities markets.”7 Em-
pirical evidence supports the latter point of view. Investor protection in the sense of well-
functioning corporate governance heavily relies on high-quality audits.8 Auditing serves
as an important instrument mitigating agency-conflicts between shareholders and man-
agement. Especially in countries with equity-financed companies, like the U.S., Australia,
or the U.K., auditing serves as a monitoring device and provides insurance to investors.9
Similarly, in emerging capital markets the monitoring function is important with respect to
agency-conflicts between controlling owners and minority shareholders because of weak gov-
ernance regulations.10 Further, in countries where debt is the dominant financing source,
1Cf. Antle (1981, p. 14).
2Cf. Gosh/Moon (2005, p. 587).
3Hayes et al. (2005, p. 85). For an illustration of potential threats to auditors’ independence, see, e.g.,
Messier et al. (2006, pp. 742), Hayes et al. (2005, p. 87), or Whittington/Pany (2004, pp. 66).
4Cf. Antle (1984, p. 1).
5Cf. SEC (2003).
6See, e.g., Ketz (2005).
7Cf. Gosh/Moon (2005, p. 588).
8Cf. Francis et al. (2003, pp. 14) for an international survey.
9Cf. Mansi et al. (2004, pp. 756), Ashbaugh/Warfield (2003, p. 4), Gul/Tsui (2001, p. 76), or Fran-
cis/Wilson (1988, p. 680). For an international comparison see Nikkinen/Sahlström (2004, pp. 255).
10Cf. Fan/Wong (2005, pp. 37).
5
like, e.g., in France or Germany, reputation transfers from auditors to clients increase finan-
cial reporting credibility, facilitating contracting procedures, i.e., agency-conflicts between
shareholders and bondholders are alleviated.11 Consequently, a lot of political effort is ded-
icated to independence topics. Nevertheless, despite of the intended improvements ongoing
competition among audit firms could harm auditors’ independence. For instance, a Green
Paper of the European Union finds that especially audits of large and prestigious clients are
hard-fought in terms of price competition.12 Obviously, auditor compensation agreements
will be suitable to derogate auditors’ independence, if the remuneration is conditioned on
the audit’s outcome. Thus, due to the self interest and advocacy threat contingent audit
fees are forbidden in many countries.13 But other fee setting strategies exist which might
impair independence less obviously. Major concerns are related to a pricing behavior called
low balling. Here the auditor sets the first period’s fee below the audit costs -incurring a
loss for the initial audit- in order to win the client. However, as a quasi-monopoly emerges
for the incumbent auditor, he expects to offset this loss in the future. Mainly, this offset
occurs due to reduced audit costs in subsequent periods.
The goal of our paper is to analyze how learning effects in the sense of the theory of
learning curves affect competition on the audit market and thus the low-balling problem.
Recent management publications highlight that learning effects influence the cost behavior
over time in two manners. Firstly, cost reductions emerge from experience due to per-
forming jobs repeatedly. Thus, learning is supposed to be an important strategic factor
in low-automation industries, like auditing. Secondly, learning effects can be fostered by
investments in learning, i.e., learning is manageable. Bundling non-audit services, like risk
advisory- or performance measurement-related assurance services, with audits could be
interpreted as audit-quality improving investments in learning about clients’ business. Al-
though the strategic implications of learning are known from the operations management
literature since the seminal paper by Wright (1936), the concept of learning curves has not
been integrated into low-balling models, yet.
The major contributions of our paper are the following: We introduce into the auditing
literature dynamic learning effects which occur with a decreasing marginal rate over the
whole lifetime of the auditor-client relationship. This contrasts other low-balling models,
11Cf. Mansi et al. (2004, pp. 773), Ashbaugh/Warfield (2003, pp. 3), or Piot (2001, p. 486) analyzing
American, German, or French data, respectively.
12Cf. EU Green Paper (1996, p. 21, no. 4.11).
13Cf. Messier et al. (2006, p. 760) or Hayes et al. (2005, p. 88).
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where learning effects are in general assumed to vanish after the initial audit. Our new
approach of integrating learning effects highlights the common grounds of the DeAngelo
(1981) and the Dye (1991) interpretation of low balling. Further, it explains the mixed em-
pirical results on low balling, as we show that fee discounts are not necessary but sufficient
for low balling. This holds true, because service conditions can also be used as strategic
competition factors. Moreover, in contrast to the present paper in other articles the audit
costs are given exogenously and they are independent of the auditor’s characteristics and
the duration of the auditor-client relationship. Due to a more comprehensive modeling, we
derive conditions under which low balling lasts for more than one period, which is in line
with the observations in business practice. Finally, our model approach is rich enough to
include benefits of tenure, learning and size as well. All these factors have been proven to
be important competition factors, empirically.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In section two the related literature
is reviewed briefly. In the third section the considered economic setting is described, the
model assumptions are introduced and the model formulation is developed. In the fourth
section the model results are interpreted. Here the analysis proceeds in five steps: In the
first step we derive model-endogenously conditions under which low balling is likely to
occur. In the second step we analyze the duration of low balling and discuss benefits of
auditor tenure in the third step. Next, we identify the benefits of learning and lastly, we
concentrate on analyzing advantages of auditor size. The fifth section concludes. All proofs
are given in the appendix.
2 Literature review and empirical evidence
Already in the 1970ies several literature contributions suspected low balling to impair au-
ditor independence.14 A theoretical rationale for this price setting behavior was given in
DeAngelo (1981). She defines a set of assumptions, henceforth referred to as DeAngelo-
world, which are rather common to low balling papers: (1) auditors compete for initial
audits via their pricing strategies, (2) all competing auditors posses the same audit tech-
nology, (3) initial audits cause start-up costs additional to the regular audit costs, and (4)
clients will face transaction costs in case of an auditor change. In equilibrium, audit fee
setting for follow-up audits ensures that clients stay with their respective auditor, although
14Cf. Schatzberg (1994, pp. 33) and the references given there.
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fees exceed costs. However, as competition is modeled by a zero-profit condition, in the
first period low balling occurs in order to win the client. The initial audit fee is defined
as the one leading to an NPV of zero for the auditor’s profits over the expected lifetime of
the mandate.15 Hence, a premature termination of the auditor-client relationship causes a
loss from the auditor’s perspective. Consequently, he might be willing to accept debatable
accounting practices, in order not to annoy the client, i.e., the profits expected in future
periods harm the auditor’s independence. This argumentation is contrasted by another
prominent explanation of low balling. Dye (1991) identifies information asymmetries with
respect to pricing to cause initial audit fee discounts.16
In the literature several extensions of low balling models can be found. Magee/Tseng
(1990) derive results similar to DeAngelo (1981). However, they relax the assumption of
homogeneous auditors. Only one of two types of auditors might suffer from independence
problems. The most important differing assumption in Kanodia/Mukherji (1994) is that
the bargaining power with respect to fee setting is assigned to the client instead of the
auditor. Further, Schatzberg (1994) combines opinion-shopping and low balling showing
–consistent to Dye’s (1991) argumentation– that information asymmetry instead of trans-
action costs might induce low balling. In his model the level of auditor’s accuracy varies,
permitting rents to occur, which finally enable low balling. Gigler/Penno (1995) relax the
assumption of identical auditing technologies and allow for auditors with different audit
costs inducing true rents to occur. Contrary to other models, Lee/Gu (1998) find that low
balling is conductive to auditor independence. The reversion of their findings compared
to DeAngelo (1981) is caused by the assumption that shareholders instead of management
contract the auditor. As a consequence, the auditor reports all debatable accounting prac-
tices conducted by the management in order to prevent shareholders from terminating
the mandate. Chan (1999) combines auditor specialization and low balling. Refining a
hotelling problem he shows that client segments exist where due to specialization no com-
petition arises. However, with decreasing levels of specialization fee cutting and then low
balling occur. An application of low balling theory in the context of software engineering
can be found in Whang (1995).
Any empirical evidence of low balling is hard to find, because even if audit fees are
observable, cost data are frequently lacking. Further a lot of determinants influences fee
setting, see, e.g., Taylor/Simon (1999), Chung/Lindsay (1988) or Simunic (1980). More-
15Cf. DeAngelo (1981, p. 122).
16Cf. Dye (1991, pp. 362).
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over, Bockus/Gigler (1998) –explaining why auditor resignations occur instead of price
adjustments– or Simunic/Stein (1990) –applying a portfolio evaluation to auditor’s client
acceptance decision in order to price risk accurately– show analytically that audit fees
should include more cost components than only direct ones. This means that low balling
could take place even if fees cover direct costs. Due to these restrictions most studies
concentrate on fee cutting instead of low balling. Given the former one the initial fee is
lower than subsequent ones, whereas for the latter one to be present at least the initial
audit costs have to exceed fees. Several empirical studies report initial audit fee discounts
of approximately 25 %, see, e.g, Deis/Giroux (1996, pp. 68), Ettredge/Greenberg (1990, p.
209) or Simon/Francis (1988, p. 263).17 Further the latter report the low balling effect to
last over the first three years of an auditor-client relationship with decreasing fee-cost gaps
in the second and third year.18 Pong/Whittington (1994) relying on U.K. data find that
new auditors charge only slightly less than incumbent auditors. Taking into consideration
start-up costs, they interpret their findings as consistent with the low-balling hypothesis.
Craswell/Francis (1999) report for the Australian audit market that fee cutting can be
observed only for auditor switches from a non-Big-8 to a Big-8 auditor.19 They conclude
that this finding is inconsistent with DeAngelo’s theory of transaction costs induced low
balling. Instead they prefer Dye’s (1991) argumentation of information asymmetry. In
contrast to other studies, Gregory/Collier (1996) analyze whether fee discounts occur as
well for non-voluntary auditor changes caused by mergers of audit companies.20 Since this
does not hold true, they conclude that reduced fees following a voluntary auditor change
are a marketing instrument. From the new auditor’s point of view fee discounts help win-
ning the client. Thus, fee discounts do not account for improved auditing technologies,
which could be an alternative explanation. Another way of analyzing low balling similar
to the cited empirical literature is conducting experimental studies, like Schatzberg (1994)
or Calegari et al. (1998). The latter identify a variety of relations between low balling and
impairment of independence.21
Some authors argue that low balling in the initial phase of an auditor-client relationship
and subsequent premium earnings are just two sides of the same medal.22 In fact, several
17An earlier study of Francis (1984, p. 147) fails to detect fee cutting.
18Cf. Simon/Francis (1988, pp. 260).
19Cf. Craswell/Francis (1999, p. 203).
20Cf. Gregory/Collier (1996, p. 25).
21Cf. Calegari et al. (1998, p. 274).
22Cf. Pong/Whittington (1994, p. 1072).
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empirical studies report a Big-X premium between 20 % and 30 % according to reputation
effects.23 For Hong Kong an even higher premium is reported.24 More interestingly, beside
Big-6 reputation and industry specialization premiums the authors find that a large local
firm does not earn a price premium but exploits its economies of scope to set lower fees
and to gain market share.25
Extending the literature review with respect to crucial assumptions of our model in the
first step, empirical literature referring to the assumption of a competitive market for initial
audits is reviewed. There exist two different approaches in analyzing market competitive-
ness. On the one hand, fee setting decisions can be analyzed directly. Here a model for
calculating competitive prices has to be developed, as done, e.g., in Simunic (1980). He
concludes “the hypothesis that price competition prevails throughout the market for audits
of publicly held companies cannot be rejected.”26 Similar results are provided by Maher et
al. (1992, p. 206), Palmrose (1986, p. 108) or Francis (1984, pp. 147). But, the observed
price differences cannot be used for analyzing the level of competition. On the other hand,
concentration studies are conducted, relying on the idea that big audit market shares sug-
gest an oligopoly to exist where competition vanishes. E.g., Hogan/Jeter (1999) report
for the American audit market that in 1976 - 1993 those audit companies increased their
market shares, which already had an advantage in size before. An additional indicator
for growing competition might be observed mergers of audit companies.27 However, static
measures of market supplier concentration might be misleading.28 Consequently, Buijink
et al. (1998) use a dynamic approach, when comparing the Dutch and the German audit
market with respect to the level of competitiveness. They show that the Dutch market is
characterized by higher concentration as well as significantly higher dynamics in market
structure compared to the German market.29 This explains the inconsistency, why reg-
23Taylor/Simon (1999, p. 384) find a large firm fee premium on a global level. Craswell et al. (1995, p. 310)
report a premium of 34 % for the Australian audit market. Moreover, they find a premium for industry
specialization of 16 %. Rose (1999, pp. 150) and Simon et al. (1992, p. 239) considering the examples of
Malaysia and Singapore show that Big-6 premiums are prevailing in markets for multinational clients.
Palmrose (1986, pp. 107) observes higher audit fees for Big-8 auditors and favours the explanation of
Big-8 being a quality indicator over the explanation of monopoly pricing. Francis/Stokes (1986, p. 392)
find Big-8 premiums on the Australian market for small auditees, only. Francis (1984, p. 142) reports
a premium for the Australian Big-8.
24Cf. DeFond et al. (2000, p. 50).
25Cf. DeFond et al. (2000, p. 61).
26Simunic (1980, p. 187).
27Cf. Hogan/Jeter (1999, p. 2).
28Cf. Buijink et al. (1998, p. 388).
29Cf. Buijink et al. (1998, p. 397).
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ulators conclude from concentration statistics a lack of competition while simultaneously
practitioners feel a ‘cutthroat competition’.30
Another important assumption in our model is that the client has the bargaining power
to insist on his preferred accounting opinions, because otherwise auditor independence
could not be impaired. The threat of dismissal can serve as an empirical proxy for this
assumption. Hartwell et al. (2001) state for their sample of SEC listed companies with at
least two auditor changes from 1989 to 1994 that in 73 % of all considered cases the client
terminated the relationship. Moreover, Hudaib/Cook (2005) find for their sample, which
is considered to be representative for non-financial U.K.-companies listed at the LSE from
1987 to 2001, that the more severe the qualification of the audit opinion is the higher is
the probability of an auditor switch.31
A major contribution of our paper is to model the effects of learning more comprehen-
sively. Some auditing papers deal with improvements of audit quality due to learning and
knowledge spill-over effects, like Simunic (1984), who considers management advisory ser-
vices as a learning device. A similar idea is presented by Beck/Wu (2006), where the auditor
learns more intensively about the client’s distribution of earnings by providing non-audit
services (NAS). Moreover, Morgan/Stocken (1998) consider the audit service itself to be a
device of learning. In contrast to these analytical papers, King/Schwartz (1999), Solomon
et al. (1999) and Low (2004) conduct experiments. The former study analyzes the impact
of different liability regimes on auditors’ learning strategies, whereas the latter two studies
concentrate on the impact of industry specialization on auditors’ learning behavior. Our
approach –belonging to the group of analytical papers– is to integrate into a low balling
model results from the theory of learning curves, as described by Wright (1936).32 Recently,
the effects of learning with respect to labor have been highlighted in the management lit-
erature; see Ittner et al. (2001), Lapre/van Wassenhove (2001) or Lapre et al. (2000). As
labor is –due to the low level of automation– the most important factor in auditing, it is ap-
parent to integrate learning into low balling models.33 In accordance with the above cited
papers we distinguish between client-specific learning and client-independent autonomous
learning.
The assumption of client-specific learning is strongly supported by empirical stud-
30Cf. Chung/Lindsay (1988, p. 20).
31Cf. Hudaib/Cook (2005, p. 1735).
32For overviews about the theory of learning curves refer to Zangwill/Kantor (1998), Venezia (1985),
Cochran (1960) or Conway/Schultz (1959).
33For the importance of the factor labor in auditing, cf. Buijink et al. (1998, p. 392).
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ies identifying a positive effect of auditor tenure on audit quality or reporting credi-
bility.34 E.g., Carcello/Nagy (2004) find that fraudulent financial reporting occurs in
the early years of an auditor-client relationship quite often; the same result is found in
Geiger/Raghunandan (2002), who identify reporting failures to occur significantly more
often in the first five years of an auditor-client relationship.35 Similarly, the AICPA doc-
uments allegations of audit failures to be increased almost by factor three for first- or
second-year audits.36 Focusing on the user perspective Gosh/Moon (2005) find evidence
that investors and rating agencies rely on audited financial reports more strongly as auditor
tenure increases.37 Moreover, Myers et al. (2003) find extreme accounting choices to be
constrained more strongly given auditor tenure is high.38 Finally, Mansi et al. (2004) report
that costs of debt decrease with auditor tenure.39 In contrast, Vanstraelen (2000) discovers
a negative relationship between auditor tenure and the probability of qualified opinions.40
Overall, the empirical evidence supports the assumption of client-specific learning. The
same holds true for industry-specific learning.41
Additionally, client-independent autonomous learning is regarded, i.e., cost reductions
emerge from experience gains due to repeatedly performing audit tasks, when serving
different clients. Hogan/Jeter (1999) state that “superior operating efficiency or economies
of scale ... are not limited to regulated industries but extend to non-regulated industries
as well.”42 Simunic (1980) considers economies of scale as well as learning effects to be
determinants of audit fees; however, for the given data sample scale economies cannot be
shown.43 In contrast, Francis/Stokes (1986) conclude diseconomies of scale to exist for
Australian non-Big-8 auditors when the clients are large.44
Lastly, we assume waiting to be an important factor for client satisfaction, too. Existing
low balling models neglect the importance of audits taking place immediately after the
34Cf. DeFond et al. (2000, p. 50).
35Cf. Carcello/Nagy (2004, p. 57) or Geiger/Raghunandan (2002, p. 74).
36Cf. Myers et al. (2003, p. 782).
37Cf. Gosh/Moon (2005, p. 599 and 602).
38Cf. Myers et al. (2003, p. 789).
39Mansi et al. (2004, p. 773).
40Vanstraelen (2000, p. 435).
41A hybrid form of learning is industry specialization, i.e., elements of client-specific as well as client-
independent learning occur simultaneously. For empirical evidence, cf., e.g., DeFond et al. (2000, p.
50), for Hong Kong data or Hogan/Jeter (2000, p. 15) for American data. Cf. Myers et al. (2003, p.
780), too.
42Cf. Hogan/Jeter (1999, p. 3). Cf. earlier studies by Kwon (1996) or Danos/Eichenseher (1982), too.
43Cf. Simunic (1980, pp. 174).
44Cf. Francis/Stokes (1986, p. 385).
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accounting date, which means that the clients compete for restricted audit capacities.45
Studies dating from the 1990’s confirm that time pressure –i.e., the existence of scare time
budgets– can be responsible for minor audit quality.46 Waiting imposes costs on the clients,
meaning that the scheduling of audits has an impact on the clients’ satisfaction and thus
their willingness to pay.47
3 Assumptions and Model
In our analysis the fee setting strategy of a single auditor is considered, who competes on
the market for initial audits. An important factor influencing fees are the regarded cost
categories. Although we make use of the zero-profit condition defined in DeAngelo (1981),
we concentrate on different cost categories. Introducing a dynamic concept of learning, we
focus on direct audit costs decreasing with a decreasing marginal rate over the whole time-
interval the auditor-client relationship exists. These costs contrast the commonly used
static start-up costs, defined as the difference between the direct audit costs of an initial
audit compared to the identical costs of all follow-up audits. Moreover, it is assumed that
all clients wish to be served as soon as possible, i.e., clients are impatient. Accordingly,
the cost category of waiting costs is introduced in our analysis. Lastly, in line with Dye’s
(1991) argumentation, we omit transaction costs, defined as all costs a client will have to
bear, if he changes the auditor, as they are not crucial in our setting.
Without loss of generality, auditor size can be defined in our model as the number of
clients. All clients j, j = 1, 2, ..., n to be audited in the considered period t, t = 0, 1, ..., T are
known when scheduling takes place.48 For ease of presentation we will assume further that
no new client will be accepted in periods t > 0, meaning that the considered auditor wins
the optimal number of clients in the initial period.49 Without taking into consideration
learning the required audit time is assumed to be given by a standard audit time, τS,
45This means we abstract from continuous audits.
46Cf. Pierce/Sweeney (2004, p. 433).
47Cf. Jahnke et al. (2005). Hui/Tse (1996) report that a negative impact on customers’ satisfaction occurs
after a waiting time of five minutes in the context of computerized services. Taylor (1994) states thirty
minutes to be the critical threshold for airline services.
48From a modeling perspective, this is not an assumption, as in equilibrium no client will switch auditors.
For a confirmation from business practice, see Barton (2005, p. 554). He reports that most Andersen
clients (95 %) stayed with their auditor until Anderson was indicted of criminal misconduct.
49This kind of client acquisition may be justified by the fact that auditor resignations are rare events, cf.
Bockus/Gigler (1998, p. 192).
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being equal for all clients. Note that this standard audit time τS is assumed only for
reasons of simplicity. It implies that each permutation, i.e., each possible sequence of audit
jobs, is equally good from the scheduling perspective.50 Considering mandates of different
workloads would require a more sophisiticated scheduling procedure, which is beyond the
scope of our paper.
Deriving the actual audit time needed for serving a certain client with given auditor
tenure requires accounting for both types of learning, i.e., client-independent autonomous
learning and client-specific learning have to be integrated. Starting with the former, we
introduce learning effects sequentially. As the auditor repeatedly performs several activ-
ities for different clients, e.g., planning the audit procedures, assembling audit teams or
preparing risk assessments, learning effects arise. Further, in course of time the auditor’s
team becomes more experienced and performs certain audit tasks more quickly. It learns
about standard routines for performing certain audit tasks and becomes more familiar with
understanding an unknown company’s book-keeping. The more audits an audit team com-
pletes the stronger the client-independent autonomous learning effects should be.51 Thus,
the required audit time is reduced for all clients except the one scheduled in the first po-
sition. The required audit time including client-independent autonomous learning effects,
τP[pos], is defined by:
τP[pos] = τ
S(1− lP )pos (1)
Here [pos], pos = 0, 1, ..., n−1 symbolizes the respective audit job’s position in the schedule.
The term (1 − lP ) depicts the client-independent autonomous learning rate, where lP is
the learning index. For ease of presentation, the standard approach for modeling learning
effects –a logarithmic formulation– is replaced by a simpler multiplicative function, which
slightly overemphasizes the learning effects. Moreover, observe that client-independent
autonomous learning only affects the audit time in the considered period, as can be inferred
from (1). Hence, autonomous learning is forgotten when a new audit cycle starts. This
can be motivated by auditor’s assistants resigning, by enactment of new accounting rules
destroying past experience or by performing other non-audit activities superposing the
acquired auditing experience.
For periods t, t > 0, i.e., for all follow-up audits, client-specific learning has to be con-
sidered.52 In general, it is argued that “auditors have to develop an in-depth knowledge of
50Cf. Biskup/Simons (2003) for an overview of scheduling and learning.
51For empirical evidence on autonomous learning in auditing see page 12.
52See the empirical evidence presented on page 11.
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the client’s business operations, processes and systems.”53 For example, the auditor learns
step-by-step about a client’s critical accounting issues which require particular attention.
Moreover, he has to develop over time contacts to employees being company’s experts for
certain accounting issues. Further, he acquires knowledge referring to organizational or
product-related characteristics of the company by-and-by improving his ability to judge
the adequacy of chosen accounting alternatives. Typically, referring to this learning phase
start-up costs are modeled to occur in the initial audit period. In the present approach this
kind of learning is modeled in a more comprehensive way. The auditor learns about the
client over time with decreasing marginal rates; the corresponding learning rate is (1− lS).
Hence, the actual required audit time τL for an audit job at position [pos] in period t is
given by:
τLt,[pos] = τ
S(1− lP )pos(1− lS)t = τP[pos](1− lS)t (2)
Comparable to our notion of client-specific learning is the modeling of Bayesian learning
in Beck/Wu (2006). They assume that auditors accumulate client-specific knowledge so
that their audit quality increases, measured in terms of precision of posterior beliefs.54
In our model instead of an increasing a constant audit quality is assumed, which can be
achieved with decreasing effort over time. In the light of liability considerations attaining a
constant quality seems to be more plausible. Moreover, the effect of client-specific learning
diminishes over time. Additionally, modeling decreasing marginal learning rates takes into
account that audit services require a minimum of time, in order to ensure sufficient audit
quality and to provide the client with a satisfactory audit atmosphere.55 In contrast to the
client-independent autonomous learning, it is assumed that client-specific learning can be
institutionalized, i.e., the reduction of required audit time is accumulated. This assumption
is in accordance with the empirical evidence showing that auditor tenure matters, see page
12.
The total required audit time, τGt , in period t is calculated by summing up over all clients
the audit times according to (2):
τGt = (1− lS)tτS
n−1∑
pos=0
(1− lP )pos = (1− lS)tτS 1− ρ
n
1− ρ , (3)
53Cf. Geiger/Raghunandan (2002, p. 70).
54Cf. Beck/Wu (2006, p. 4).
55Formally, a lower bound of audit time and thus of audit costs can be derived, see (9).
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with ρ = 1− lP . A client’s j waiting time in period t, t = 0, 1, ..., T , is the sum of all pre-
viously served clients’ audit times including the own audit time. Thus, the corresponding
sum of waiting times, τWt , which occur in period t over all clients, is given by (4):56
τWt = (1− lS)tτS
n−1∑
pos=0
1− ρpos+1
1− ρ (4)
When thinking about the fee for a certain client, the auditor has to be aware of the direct
audit costs, because he wants to be compensated for his expenses. Further, he has to take
into consideration the client’s waiting costs, because otherwise the client might lobby for
another service date. Finally, learning spillovers have to be considered. Let factor α be
the costs per unit of audit time, e.g., the hourly salary of the audit team. The total audit
costs of a period t, CAt , are then given by CAt = ατGt , implying that audit costs behave
proportionally in audit times. Analogously, β depicts the monetary equivalent of one hour
of waiting. For ease of presentation assume β = 1. Then the total waiting costs, CWt ,
are defined as CWt = τWt . Accordingly, α can be interpreted as the weight of audit costs
relative to waiting costs. Total costs, CGt , are calculated by CGt = CWt + CAt as given in
(5):57
CGt =
τS(1− lS)t
1− ρ
[
n + 1 + α− 1− ρ
n
1− ρ − (1 + α)ρ
n
]
(5)
Consider the following example for a demonstration of how (5) is used for deriving fee
setting in equilibrium. Assume that the regarded auditor conducts the second follow-up
audit for his three clients. Without learning each audit would last for 10 time units [TU],
however client-independent autonomous learning takes place with a learning index of 10
%, client-specific learning shows a learning index of 20 %. The direct costs per time unit
of audit time is supposed to be 10 monetary units [MU].
Example: Given these pieces of information, the parameters are
n = 3; t = 2; τS = 10 [TU]; lP = 0.1; lS = 0.2 and α = 10 [MU/TU].
Then, the schedule without any learning effects looks as depicted in Figure 1: Thereby, each
audit job is indicated by a box. The number in the upper left corner of each box indicates
the job’s position in the schedule and the number in the upper right corner represents the
56For the derivation refer to appendix 1.
57For the derivation refer to appendix 2.
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Figure 1: schedule without learning
respective processing time.
Considering autonomous learning only, the schedule would change to the presented in
Figure 2:
Figure 2: schedule with autonomous learning
Taking into consideration both learning types, the actual schedule is given by:
Figure 3: schedule with autonomous and client-specific learning
The actual schedule given in Figure 3 transfers into the following cost situation, presented
in Table 1. Given the cost data, the charge Gt can be calculated.
The reading example for client 1 is presented in the following: The audit lasts for 6.4 [TU]
according to Figure 3. Multiplying with the direct audit costs per unit of 10 [MU/TU]
results in direct costs of 64.00 [MU]. Additionally, 6.4 [TU] of waiting have to be considered,
i.e., waiting costs of 6.4 [MU] have to be added. Thus, total costs of 70.40 [MU] are caused
by auditing client 1.
Note that in the example given acquiring additional clients is beneficial to the auditor,
since the total costs are decreasing from 70.40 [MU] over 69.76 [MU] to 69.14 [MU] over the
clients. However, the given cost allocation is not a stable one. By assumption, all clients
have the same attributes, especially, they all require the same standard audit time. Just
by chance -or to be more precise just as a result of scheduling- client 3 shows lower total
costs, as he benefits from the learning effects gathered by the auditor when auditing clients
1 and 2. Obviously, a cost re-allocation has to take place, because otherwise client 1 would
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client 1 client 2 client 3
∑
remark
direct audit costs 64.00 57.60 51.80 173.4
waiting costs 6.40 12.16 17.34 35.9
total costs 70.40 69.76 69.14 209.3 209.3
3
= 69.77 = Gt
maximal fee 63.37 57.60 52.43 69.77 - waiting costs
cross-subsidizing -0.63 0.00 0.63
Table 1: cost calculation
prefer being scheduled in the last position. Thus, in equilibrium the average total costs
of 69.77 [MU] should be imposed on each client. Since client 1 has faced waiting costs of
6.40 [MU] already, the fee should equal 63.37 [MU], only. Proceeding this way, every client
has to bear costs of 69.77 [MU] in total. Thus, a cross-subsidizing occurs, when charging
the clients, i.e., the total direct costs caused by a respective audit differ from the fee to be
actually paid.
4 Interpretation and implications of the model results
4.1 Conditions for a competitive market of first audits to exist
From a regulator’s perspective, it is important to know, under which circumstances low
balling is likely to occur, i.e., when does a competitive market for initial audits emerge?58
This question is important, because a competitive market implies that acquiring new clients
is advantageous to auditors. At a first glance, the zero-profit condition in DeAngelo (1981)
contradicts the idea of growing auditors. However, this contradiction might be resolved
when acquiring new clients could yield competitive advantages due to learning effects. This
is the case, when the auditor benefits from increasing the number of his clients, as it was
shown in the example above. From inspecting (5) in more detail a formal condition can
be derived. A competitive market for initial audits will emerge model-endogenously, if the
average total costs are monotonously decreasing in the number of clients.59 This can be
58Cf. the empirical evidence presented on page 10, too.
59Cf. Pong/Whittington (1994, p. 1075), who explicitly test for economies of scale.
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checked by calculating the first difference as given in (6).60
Δ1C
D
t (n + 1) =
τS(1− lS)t
1− ρ
[(n + 1)ρn − nρn+1 − 1] [(1 + α)(1− ρ)− 1]
(n2 + n)(1− ρ) (6)
Equating (6) to zero and rearranging terms yields:
[
(n + 1)ρn − nρn+1] [(1 + α)(1− ρ)− 1] = [(1 + α)(1− ρ)− 1] (7)
The first term on the left hand side of (7) is always positive but never greater than one,
thus, (8) follows:61
Δ1C
D
t (n + 1)
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
> 0 if and only if (1 + α)(1− ρ) < 1
= 0 if and only if (1 + α)(1− ρ) = 1
< 0 if and only if (1 + α)(1− ρ) > 1
(8)
Summing up, a competitive audit market will be explained model-endogenously, if and only
if the condition in the last row of (8) is fulfilled, i.e., if one of the following two constellations
is given. Firstly, competition is induced, if waiting costs are relatively unimportant, i.e.,
α > ρ
1−ρ . Secondly, if client-independent autonomous learning effects are strong, i.e., lP >
1
1+α
, competition will arise.62 Given a competitive market exists, the average total costs
per client in period t are restricted by a lower bound Ct which is achieved by calculating
CDt for n →∞:
Ct =
τS(1− lS)t
1− ρ (9)
Our finding is consistent to Simunic/Stein (1990), who state that “in the limit, th[e]
diversification effect drives industry structure to a single auditing firm.”63 Since (8) is
independent of n, for Δ1CDt (n+1) < 0, the auditor intends to grow unboundedly. Further,
our finding is consistent to Francis et al. (1999), who argue that market leadership is an
important strategic factor to signal superior quality and to built up a brand reputation.64
In our context, superior quality respectively a brand reputation could be interpreted as
a high learning index, which induces the auditor to grow. This means our reasoning
60For the derivation refer to appendix 3.
61For the derivation refer to appendix 4.
62This finding is consistent to Elitzur/Falk (1996, p. 48).
63Cf. Simunic/Stein (1990, p. 338).
64Cf. Francis, Stokes, Anderson (1999, p. 188).
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is reversed compared to Francis et al. (1999). However, the close relationship between
market leadership and brand reputation can be established.
4.2 Duration of low balling
For several reasons a second interesting question is how long low balling takes place in a
certain auditor-client relationship. On the one hand, the results might indicate whether
regulators should focus on mandates with rather short or with rather long auditor tenure
when aiming at protecting auditor independence or improving audit quality.65 On the other
hand, in DeAngelo (1981) low balling lasts for only one period per definition. However,
empirical findings by Simon/Francis (1988) report the low balling effect to last for more
than one period.66 Thus, a contradiction occurs, which is to be resolved in our model.
Analyzing the duration of low balling in our model context proceeds in three steps:
Firstly, we derive the auditor’s dominant pricing profile by comparing the considered audi-
tor to another one, who is equally large in terms of number of clients and shows identical
learning indices, lS and lP .67 In the second step we apply the zero-profit condition, in order
to calculate the charges’ actual amounts. In the third step, we compare these charges to
the costs incurred by an audit according to (9). Identifying the first period, in which the
former exceeds the latter, gives the achieved result.
Given a competitive market, according to (8) the auditor intends to win as many clients
as possible. His only device for winning a client is the applied charging profile Ω,Ω :=
(G0, G1, ..., G∞), where the charge, Gt, imposed on a client in period t consists of the
audit fee and the waiting costs, as can be inferred from Table 1. The applied charging
profile has to be selected from the set of all feasible profiles, i.e., Ω ∈ G. Taking into
consideration the zero-profit condition, charge discounts in one period have to be offset
in other ones. Further, as the client selects the auditor offering the lowest charge in each
period and the auditors are identical in terms of size and learning capabilities, it suffices
to analyze pairs (G0, GF ), with G1, G2, ... = GF . Thus, the following charging profiles are
feasible; G = {(G;G), (G− ε;G + κ), (G + ε;G− κ)}, where κ symbolizes the rent being
NPV-equivalent to ε, with ε > κ.
65For the importance of independence see page 5 and for empirical results on auditor tenure see page 12.
66Cf. Simon/Francis (1988, p. 260).
67Assuming equally large auditors implies audit service to be a homogeneous good, i.e., we concentrate on
competition within the group of Big-4, national or local auditors, respectively, cf., e.g., Barton (2005,
p. 555).
20
Table 2 shows the pairwise comparison of the strategies; reading examples are given
immediately below the table. If an auditor following the row-strategy competes against an
auditor following the column-strategy, two results have to be considered. The first entry
in brackets shows the outcome in the initial period t0 and the second entry depicts the
outcome in the subsequent period tF , given the row-player was selected as auditor in t0.
For the subsequent period tF it has to be recognized, that the row-auditor (if incumbent)
sets the charge GF , whereas the column-auditor once again plays G0.
(G;G) (G− ε;G + κ) (G + ε;G− κ)
(G;G) (tie, tie) (loss, –) (win, keep)
(G− ε;G + κ) (win, loss) (tie, loss) (win, keep)
(G + ε;G− κ) (loss, –) (loss, –) (tie, keep)
Table 2: pairwise comparison of strategies
As a reading example consider the first row, i.e., the regarded auditor chooses the charg-
ing strategy (G;G). Depending on the opponent’s strategy, different outcomes arise:
1. Facing another auditor following (G;G), in the initial period t0 a tie occurs, because
both auditors offer G0 = G as a charge. Assume for a moment, that the regarded
auditor is selected. Then, in the subsequent period tF , he charges GF = G. The
opponent still offers G0 = G. However, as both offers are G a tie occurs, again.68
2. Facing an auditor following strategy (G− ε;G + κ), in t0 the regarded auditor offers
G0 = G, whereas the opponent offers G0 = G− ε. Accordingly, the regarded auditor
is not selected. Hence, the question whether the regarded auditor is able to keep the
client in the subsequent period has not to be answered.
3. Facing an other auditor following the strategy (G + ε;G − κ) the regarded auditor
wins the client in the initial period by offering G0 = G < G + ε. In the subsequent
period the regarded auditor offers GF = G, whereas the opponent once again uses
his initial offer G0 = G + ε. Accordingly, the regarded auditor retains his client.
By comparing strategy (G;G) to strategy (G + ε;G − κ) it becomes obvious, that the
former strategy strictly dominates the latter, because its outcomes are strictly better in
two cases and equal in case of competing against strategy (G − ε;G + κ). Thus, after
68For simplicity, assume that in case of a tie the regarded player is selected as auditor.
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eliminating the dominated strategy (G + ε;G − κ), only the bold entries in Table 2 have
to be considered. At a first glance, strategy (G − ε;G + κ) seems to perform better,
because the client is won in the initial period t0. However, the clients leave the auditor
for sure in the subsequent period tF . Consequently, after having granted a discount ε in
the initial period, the auditor definitely loses money when selecting this strategy. Thus,
in equilibrium, only strategy (G;G) is played. This means, charges are equally high for
all periods, implying Gt = G ∀t. Let Ω∗ denote the optimal charging profile and G∗∞ the
optimal charge in equilibrium.
Taking into consideration the zero-profit condition the charge G∗∞ can be derived by
transforming the NPV of the average total costs into a constant annuity.69 The NPV of
the audit costs over an infinite time horizon for an interest rate i is given by (10).70
NPVG(i,∞) = τ
S
1− ρ
1 + i
i + lS
(10)
Because in period t = 0 the initial audit takes place, the optimal charge G∗∞ can be derived
by multiplying the NPV calculated according to (10) with the factor i
1+i
, accounting for
an infinite annuity due:
G∗∞ =
τS
1− ρ
i
i + lS
(11)
A lower bound t∗ for the time interval where low balling occurs can be derived by searching
for the period in which the audit charge according to (11) is for the first time greater than
the total average costs according to (9):
τS
1− ρ
[
i
i + lS
− (1− lS)t∗
]
> 0 ⇔ t∗ > ln
i
i+lS
ln(1− lS) (12)
Using the data from the example on page 18, according to (11) the charge in equilibrium
would equal G∗∞ =
10
0.1
0.1
0.3
= 33.33. Calculating t∗ according to (12) yields 4.92, stating
that low balling should not be observed from the fifth follow-up audit onwards. However,
calculating the average total costs in t = 5 for the data of the example gives:
Obviously, the charge of 33.33 is smaller than the total average costs of 35.73. The reason
for this is that only three clients are considered. Calculating with 100 clients yields average
69The idea of a multi-period pricing incorporating the cost reduction due to learning can already be found
in Simunic (1980, p. 187).
70For the derivation refer to appendix 5.
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client 1 client 2 client 3
∑
remark
direct audit costs 32.77 29.49 26.54 88.8
waiting costs 3.28 6.23 8.88 18.39
total costs 36.05 35.72 35.42 107.19 107.19
3
= 35.73
Table 3: costs in t = 5
total costs of 33.09, establishing the claimed result.
Condition (12) yields a low balling interval of length t∗ > 1 for realistic parameter
settings with lS < (1 − i), i.e., low balling occurs for more than one period. Thus, the
above identified contradiction between the finding in DeAngelo (1981) and the empirical
evidence presented in Simon/Francis (1988, p. 260) is resolved. Modeling dynamic learning
effects instead of using the concept of start-up costs explains the occurrence of low balling
for more than one period. After this low balling phase, where a loss is accumulated, charges
exceed costs and loss-offsetting takes place. However, according to the assumption of an
infinite time-horizon, the auditor never regains complete independence.71
4.3 Benefit of auditor tenure
A very similar question compared to the section above is, whether auditor tenure is benefi-
cial or not. This question turned out to be especially important from the clients perspective,
when mandatory auditor rotation was discussed in the U.S.72 “Proponents of tenure reg-
ulation argue that requiring auditor rotation would improve audit quality by periodically
providing a new perspective and that rotation would reduce the client’s ability to influ-
ence the auditor by limiting the value of incumbency.”73 The aspect of ‘controlling the
controllers’ is not represented in our model. Nevertheless, cost consequences of manda-
tory auditor rotation can be analyzed. In order to highlight the effects most prominently,
consider an auditor rotation would be required after two periods, i.e., only one follow-up
audit is permitted. Because the considerations about the charges in equilibrium remain
unchanged, it can be derived in the same way as in the section above.74 Let G∗2 denote the
71Cf. the reviewed empirical findings on auditor tenure on page 12.
72Cf. Gosh/Moon (2005, p. 588) for a literature review on the discussion of mandatory auditor rotation.
73Cf. Geiger/Raghunanandan (2002, p. 69).
74For the derivation refer to appendix 6.
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charge in equilibrium, if only two audits are allowed:
G∗2 =
τS
1− ρ
2 + i− lS
2 + i
(13)
Comparing (13) with (11) shows the increase in charges:
ΔG(i, lS, ρ) = G
∗
2 −G∗∞ =
τS
1− ρ
lS(2− lS)
(2 + i)(i + lS)
(14)
From (14) it becomes obvious that lS heavily influences the increase of charges. Assuming
i = lS = lP = 0.1 the charge increases by 90.8 % compared to an infinite time horizon.
4.4 Benefit of learning
In this section benefits of learning are considered, which especially addresses the ques-
tion of auditor specialization.75 Specialization offers an opportunity to earn true rents
by realizing not anticipated improvements in learning, i.e., the learning index is increased
respectively the learning rate is reduced. The ex ante calculated loss from low balling is
overcompensated in advance. In the present modeling approach two alternatives of gener-
ating true rents exist. On the one hand, the auditor could improve client-specific learning.
This could be done for example by assigning the same audit team to the client every year.
Another way of improving client-specific learning would be to provide non-audit services
additionally, which gives the opportunity to acquire further insights in the client company’s
structure. Given an infinite time horizon increasing the client-specific learning index leads
to the following reduction of costs:
∂NPVG(i,∞)
∂lS
= − τ
S
1− ρ
1 + i
(i + lS)2
(15)
On the other hand true rents could be realized by a not anticipated improvement of client
independent autonomous learning lP . This could be done for example by specializing on
a certain industry. Further international accounting harmonization or national accounting
harmonization with respect to companies’ legal structure could allow for improvements of
client-independent autonomous learning, as the diversity of accounting practices is reduced.
75This is an important trend in auditing, see, e.g., Ferguson/Stokes (2002, p. 87) or Craswell et al. (1995,
pp. 300).
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Lastly, abolishing legal accounting options could have a similar impact. The auditor’s
benefit of this kind of learning can be inferred from (16):
∂NPVG(i,∞)
∂lP
= − τ
S
(1− ρ)2
1 + i
i + lS
(16)
Comparing (15) and (16) helps identifying the more promising learning improvements.
Given lS < lP − i, investing in client-specific learning earns higher true rents than investing
in autonomous learning and vice versa.
Further the motivation to achieve client-specific learning improvements depends on the
rotation regime. Under a mandatory auditor rotation after two audits, the cost reduction
is:
∂NPVG(i, 2)
∂lS
= − τ
S
(1− ρ)(1 + i) (17)
Comparing (15) and (17) shows that the auditor’s benefit given an infinite time horizon
is
(
1+i
i+lS
)2
times greater than given a two period horizon. Note that the benefits are
realized over heavily varying time intervals. Nevertheless, from the economy’s perspective
it is evident that the auditors’ incentives to improve the audit technology by learning are
reduced significantly under a mandatory rotation.
4.5 Benefit of size
In practice significant differences in size exist between large multi-national audit firms and
national majors or national minors.76 Accordingly, the last question to be addressed in
this paper is whether auditor size matters with respect to low balling and independence.77
Empirical studies indicate that a positive association between auditor size and audit pricing
exists. This means the larger an audit firm is the higher are the fees it can demand.78 This
holds true even if national minors differing very little in size are compared to each other.79
When deciding upon the charging strategy the larger auditor has not to regard the
own costs but he has to take into consideration the charges of the next largest competing
76Cf. Francis/Wilson (1988, p. 664): “Taken literally, DeAngelo’s argument suggests that a cardinal or-
dering of auditor size can be used to proxy for audit quality.” It is assumed often that auditor size is
an indicator for reputation and audit quality, cf., e.g., Barton (2005, p. 554) or Palmrose (1986, p. 98).
77For a discussion on how to measure auditor size, refer to Pong/Whittington (1994, p. 1075).
78Cf. De Fond et al. (2000), Rose (1999), or Simon et al. (1992).
79Cf. Niemi (2004, p. 556); Vander Bauwhede and Willekens (2004) obtain contradicting results for the
Belgian audit market.
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auditor. Thus, advantages in size allow the realization of true rents. In the following the
advantage with respect to audit costs is quantified by comparing the average total costs
depending on the number of clients. For this reason it is assumed that the smaller auditor
serves n clients whereas the large one attends m = n + Γ clients. Hence:
CDt (n)− CDt (m) =
τS(1− lS)t
1− ρ [	(n)− 	(m)]
=
τS(1− lS)t
(1− ρ)
[
(1 + α)(1− ρ)− 1
n(n + Γ)(1− ρ)
[
Γ− nρn(1− ρΓ)− Γρn]]︸ ︷︷ ︸
γ(Γ)
(18)
The term γ(Γ) is always positive, see appendix 7. This indicates that the larger auditor
realizes a cost advantage. Summing up over the infinite time horizon yields the NPV of
the true rent Π(Γ):
Π(γ) =
τS
1− ργ(Γ)
∞∑
t=0
(1− lS)t = τ
S
1− ρ
γ(Γ)
lS
(19)
This finding is consistent to Niemi (2004) that larger firms can achieve true rents, whereas
smaller ones cannot, because γ(Γ) depends on the difference between ε(n) and ε(m).
Presupposed that low balling harms auditor independence (19) offers an interesting alter-
native for alleviating the problem. Given the audit market would be segmented according
to auditor size -which can be observed in reality- smaller audit firms in each segment would
guarantee the independence of the larger firms in this segment.80
5 Conclusion
The present paper models more comprehensively learning effects in the context of auditing,
because these learning effects are the key points for low balling. With the presented
modeling approach it has been possible to show
1. under which circumstances the common assumption of competitive audit markets in
low balling models can be justified model-endogenously,
2. that low balling lasts for longer than only the initial audit period,
80This result is consistent with the finding in Piot (2001, p. 491) that Big-6 and national major audit
firms compete in the same market segment.
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3. that low balling is prevalent even if the audit charges remain constant over time,
4. that mandatory external auditor rotation imposes non-negligible costs on the clients,
and
5. that a segmentation of the audit market, where size of audit firms’ and clients’ are
correlated, can alleviate the problem of low balling.
Although the assumptions of a DeAngelo world, which are applied here, are relatively re-
strictive our analysis gives some interesting insights which could serve as thought-provoking
impulses:
1. As low balling is difficult to detect in empirical studies due to data restrictions, fee-
cutting is often interpreted as an indicator for low balling. Our results suggest that
low balling might exist, even if no fee-cutting can be observed.
2. The empirical findings referring to the relationship between size and reputation are
mixed. Our results could serve as an explanation why this is the case. Probably
some of the analyzed audit markets are competitive whereas others are not.
3. Mandatory auditor rotation and the restriction of non-audit services should not be
discussed detached from learning effects as costs could be doubled by ad-hoc changes.
4. For ensuring auditor independence the revenues resulting from a single client are
legally capped in many countries. If this induces a matching of big audit and big
client firms this mitigates the problem of auditor-independence in the light of our
results shown in (19). However if it restricts the market access for small audit firms
it even exaggerates the problem in our model context, because the existence of small
audit firms is beneficial to the big audit firms’ independence.
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Appendix
Appendix 1: A client’s j waiting time in period t, t = 0, 1, ..., T , is the sum of all previously
served clients’ audit times including the own audit time:
τWt = (1− lS)tτS
n−1∑
h=0
h∑
pos=0
(1− lP )pos = (1− lS)tτS
n−1∑
h=0
1− ρh+1
1− ρ
= (1− lS)tτS
n−1∑
pos=0
1− ρpos+1
1− ρ (20)
Replacing h by pos is feasible, because both indicate the position of a client in the schedule.
Appendix 2: The total costs CGt are the sum of audit and waiting costs. Splitting up the
sum and adding ρ0 yields the presented result.
CGt = τ
S(1− lS)t
{
α
1− ρn
1− ρ +
n−1∑
pos=0
1− ρpos+1
1− ρ
}
= τS(1− lS)t
(
1− ρ1
1− ρ +
1− ρ2
1− ρ + ... +
1− ρn−1
1− ρ + (1 + α)
1− ρn
1− ρ
)
= −τ
S(1− lS)t
1− ρ
[−n + ρ0 − ρ0 + ρ1 + ρ2 + ... + ρn−1 − α + (1 + α)ρn]
=
τS(1− lS)t
1− ρ
[
n + 1 + α− 1− ρ
n
1− ρ − (1 + α)ρ
n
]
(21)
Appendix 3: The first difference of the average total costs is given by:
Δ1C
D
t (n + 1) = C
D
t (n + 1)− CDt (n)
=
τS(1− lS)t
(1− ρ)
[
1 +
1 + α
n + 1
− 1− ρ
n+1
(n + 1)(1− ρ) −
1 + α
n + 1
ρn+1−
1− 1 + α
n
+
1− ρn
n(1− ρ) +
1 + α
n
ρn
]
=
τS(1− lS)t
(1− ρ)
[(n + 1)ρn − nρn+1 − 1] [(1 + α)(1− ρ)− 1]
(n2 + n)(1− ρ) (22)
Appendix 4: The first term in brackets of (7) is always positive but never greater than
one:
(n + 1)ρn − nρn+1 > 0 ⇔ n + 1
n
> ρ (23)
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The last ratio in (23) is greater than one, whereas ρ is smaller than one per definition,
hence the last inequality is true.
(n + 1)ρn − nρn+1 < 1
⇔ nρn(1− ρ) < 1− ρn
⇔ nρn < 1− ρ
n
1− ρ (24)
The last inequality is true, because on the right hand side of (24) a geometric row with n
elements is shown. Due to ρ < 1 each of the elements is greater than ρn.
Appendix 5: The average audit costs of a client in period t are given by:
CGt
n
=
τS(1− lS)t
1− ρ
n + 1 + α− 1−ρn
1−ρ − (1 + α)ρn
n︸ ︷︷ ︸
ε(n)
(25)
Summing up the discounted average audit costs over all periods results in an infinite row,
which can be calculated explicitly for positive interest rates i. ε(n) can be eliminated from
the sum, because it is independent of t:
NPVG(i,∞) = τ
S
1− ρ ε(n)
∞∑
t=0
(
1− lS
1 + i
)t
=
τS
1− ρ
1 + i
i + lS
ε(n) (26)
For equally large audit firms ε(n) is identical, hence it can be neglected. For large audit
firms, i.e., n →∞, it approaches one.
Appendix 6: The NPV of the total audit costs for a two period horizon is given by:
NPVG(i, 2) =
τS
1− ρ
[
1 +
1− ls
1 + i
]
=
τS
1− ρ
2 + i− lS
1 + i
(27)
G∗2 =
(1 + i)2i
(1 + i)2 − 1
1
1 + i
τS
1− ρ
2 + i− lS
1 + i
=
τS
1− ρ
2 + i− lS
2 + i
(28)
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Appendix 7:
γ(Γ) > 0
⇔ m− (n + m)ρn + nρn+m > 0
⇔ m(1− ρ)n > nρn(1− ρm)
⇔ m 1− ρ
n
1− ρm > nρ
n (29)
For m = 1 (29) equals (24). For increasing m the condition (29) is relaxed, because the
left hand side increases in m.
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